Commutative-like Encryption: A New Characterization of ElGamal by Dai, Wei
ar
X
iv
:1
01
1.
37
18
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
6 N
ov
 20
10
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Abstract
Commutative encryption is a useful but rather strict notion in cryptography. In
this paper, we define a loose variation of commutative encryption-commutative-like
encryption and give an example: the generalization of ElGamal scheme. The application
of the new variation is also discussed.
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1. Introduction
Informally, a commutative encryption is a pair of encryption functions f and g such that f(g(v)) =
g(f(v)). Commutative encryption is extremely useful in modern cryptography since many protocols
rely on the existence of commutative encryption[1, 2, 3, 4]. However, few encryption schemes are
known to be commutative. In this paper, we introduce a loose notion of “commutative-like en-
cryption” and propose a primitive: the generalization of ElGamal. First introduced by ElGamal[5],
the ElGamal encryption is one of the most famous public key encryption schemes and has var-
ious applications[6, 7, 8]. Based on ElGamal encryption, this new characterization shares most
advantages of commutative encryption and ElGamal while the definition itself is not as strict as
commutative encryption.
2. Preliminaries
We first describe some relevant definitions that would be used in the paper.
2.1. Commutative encryption
Our definition of commutative encryption below is similar to the constructions used in [9, 10] and
others. As showed above, a commutative encryption is a pair of encryption functions f and g such
that f(g(v)) = g(f(v)). Thus by using the combination f(g(v)) to encrypt v, we can ensure that
R cannot compute the encryption of a value without the help of S. In addition, even though the
encryption is a combination of two functions, each party can apply their function first and still get
the same result.
DEFINITION 1 (Indistinguishability). Let Ωk ⊆ {0, 1}
k be a finite domain of k-bit numbers.
Let D1 = D1(Ωk) and D2 = D2(Ωk) be distributions over Ωk. Let Ak(x) be an algorithm that, given
x ∈ Ωk, returns either true or false. We define distribution D1 of random variable x ∈ Ωk to be
computationally indistinguishable from distribution D2 if for any family of polynomial-step (w.r.t.
k) algorithms Ak(x), any positive polynomial p(·), and all sufficiently large k,
|Pr[Ak(x)|x ∼ D1]− Pr[Ak(x)|x ∼ D2]| <
1
p(k)
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where x ∼ D denotes that x is distributed according to D, and Pr[Ak(x)] is the probability that Ak(x)
returns true.
Throughout this paper, we will use “indistinguishable” as shorthand for“computationally indis-
tinguishable”.
DEFINITION 2 (Commutative Encryption). A commutative encryption F is a computable (in
polynomial time) function f : Key F× Dom F → Dom F , defined on finite computable domains,
that satisfies all properties listed below. We denote fe(x) = f(e, x), and use “∈r” to mean “is chosen
uniformly at random from”.
1. Commutative. For all e, e′ ∈ Key F we have
fe ◦ fe′ = fe′ ◦ fe
2. Each fe: Dom F → Dom F is a bijection.
3. The inverse f−1e is also computable in polynomial-time given e.
4. The distribution of 〈x, fe(x), y, fe(y)〉 is indistinguishable from the distribution of 〈x, fe(x), y, z〉,
where x, y, z ∈r Dom F and e ∈r Key F .
2.2. ElGamal encryption
We define the ElGamal public-key encryption scheme. The ElGamal encryption scheme is based on
the Diffie-Hellman assumption and it is a probabilistic encryption scheme, i.e., a specific message
has many-exponential in the security parameter-possible encryptions. Formally,
DEFINITION 3 (ElGamal Public-Key Encryption Scheme[5, 11]) The ElGamal public key
encryption scheme is defined by a triplet (G,E,D) of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms, with
the following properties:
• The system setup algorithm, S, on input 1n, where n is the security parameter, outputs the
system parameters (P,Q, g), where (P,Q, g) is an instance of the DLP collection, i.e., P is a
uniformly chosen prime of length P = n + δ for a specified constant δ, and g is a uniformly
chosen generator of the subgroup GQ of prime order Q of Z
∗
P , where Q = (P − 1)/γ is prime
and γ is a specified small integer.
• The key generating algorithm, G, on input (P,Q, g), outputs a public key, e = (P,Q, g, y), and
a private key, d = (P,Q, g, x), where x ∈r ZQ, and y ≡ g
x mod P .
• The encryption algorithm, E, on input (P,Q, g, y) and a message m ∈ GQ, uniformly selects
an element k ∈r ZQ and outputs
E((P,Q, g, y),m) = (gk(mod P ),myk(mod P ))
• The decryption algorithm, D, on input (P,Q, g, x) and a ciphertext (y1, y2), outputs
D((P, g, x), (y1, y2)) = y2(y
x
1
)−1(mod P )
3. Re-encryption
In this section, we present a re-encryption algorithm of ElGamal. Unlike most other schemes, using
ElGamal encryption we obtain ciphertext (y1, y2), in this re-encryption algorithm, we need not to
encrypt y1 and y2 respectively, details follow (to simplify the description, we still use the terms
defined in the previous section):
• To encrypt the plaintext m (i.e., the “first” encryption step), we use the ElGamal scheme:
– Key generation: Let xA be the element uniformly chosen from ZQ, and yA ≡ g
xA mod P .
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– Encryption: On input (P,Q, g, yA) and a message (plaintext) m ∈ GQ, uniformly selects
an element kA ∈r ZQ and outputs
E((P,Q, g, yA),m) = (g
kA(mod P ),myA
kA(mod P ))
• To re-encrypt the plaintext (y1, y2) = (g
kA(mod P ),myA
kA(mod P )) (i.e., the re-encryption
step), we use an algorithm similar to the ElGamal scheme:
– Key generation: Let xB be the element uniformly chosen from ZQ, and yB ≡ g
xB mod
P .
– Re-encryption: The re-encryption algorithm ER, On input (P,Q, g, yB) and a ciphertext
(y1, y2) = (g
kA(mod P ),myA
kA(mod P )), uniformly selects an element kB ∈r ZQ and
outputs
ER((P,Q, g, yB), y1, y2) = (y1, g
kB (mod P ), y2yB
kB (mod P ))
Note that since (y1, y2) = (g
kA(mod P ),myA
kA(mod P )), the ciphertext (after re-encryption)
is
ER((P,Q, g, yB), y1, y2) = (g
kA(mod P ), gkB (mod P ),myA
kAyB
kB (mod P ))
To simplify, let (c1, c2, c3) = (g
kA(mod P ), gkB (mod P ),myA
kAyB
kB (mod P )) and so
ER((P,Q, g, yB), (y1, y2)) = (c1, c2, c3). Also, we use EA and EB(EA) to represent the encryption
and re-encryption processes respectively (with key xA and xB).
The decryption is also similar to the ElGama scheme, but need to decrypt twice, details follow:
• First round: The decryption algorithm, DB, on input (P,Q, g, xB) and a ciphertext (c1, c2, c3),
outputs
DB((P, g, xB), (c1, c2, c3)) = (c1, c3(c
xB
2
)−1(mod P ))
Now let us see what we obtain after this round: from (c1, c2, c3) = (g
kA( mod P ), gkB ( mod P ),myA
kAyB
kB ( mod
P )) we come up with c1 = g
kA(mod P ) and
c3(c
xB
2
)−1(mod P ) = mykAA (mod P )
Thus we end up with DB((P, g, xB), (c1, c2, c3)) = (y1, y2), using ElGamal scheme we could decrypt
the ciphertext (y1, y2):
• The decryption algorithm, DA, on input (P,Q, g, xA) and a ciphertext (y1, y2), outputs
DA((P, g, xA), (y1, y2)) = y2(y
xA
1
)−1(mod P )(= m)
In this paper, we directly present a theorem concerning the security of the re-encryption scheme
without proving it. For the proof, we recommend readers to Ref.[11]
Theorem 1 If the re-encryption scheme is not secure in the sense of indistinguishability, then
there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing Machine (p.p.t. TM) that solves the decision
Diffie-Hellman problem with overwhelming probability.
Furthermore, it is proved that breaking decision D-H problem is almost as hard as computing
discrete logarithms[12], while computing discrete logarithms is as hard as languages in NPC unless
the polynomial hierarchy (PH) collapses to the second level[13].
3
4. Commutative-like encryption
Commutative-like encryption is a new notion presented in this paper, before giving the definition of
commutative-like encryption, let us first check one property of the above re-encryption scheme.
In the decryption scheme, we decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext in a way corresponding to the
order of encryption, however, we may apply a different order, details follow:
• First round: The decryption algorithm, DA, on input (P,Q, g, xA) and a ciphertext (c1, c2, c3),
outputs
DA((P, g, xA), (c1, c2, c3)) = (c2, c3(c
xA
1
)−1(mod P ))
Now let us see what we obtain after this round: from (c1, c2, c3) = (g
kA( mod P ), gkB ( mod P ),myA
kAyB
kB ( mod
P )) we come up with c2 = g
kB (mod P ) and
c3(c
xA
1
)−1(mod P ) = mykBB (mod P )
Thus we end up with DA((P, g, xA), (c1, c2, c3)) = (y
′
1
, y′
2
), where y′
1
= gkB (mod P ) and y′
2
=
mykBB (mod P ) using ElGamal scheme we could decrypt the ciphertext (y
′
1
, y′
2
):
• The decryption algorithm, DB, on input (P,Q, g, xB) and a ciphertext (y
′
1
, y′
2
), outputs
DB((P, g, xB), (y
′
1
, y′
2
)) = y2(y
xB
1
)−1(mod P )
Clearly, in both decryption schemes, we have the plaintext at the last step. This suggests
a “commutative-like” characterization: the result of decryption does not relies on the order of
decryptions, more specifically, in the scheme, letm be the plaintext and (c1, c2, c3) be the ciphertext,
we have
DA(DB(c1, c2, c3)) = DB(DA(c1, c2, c3)) = m
or equivalently, we have
DB(DA(EB(EA(m)))) = m
Largely due to the probabilistic nature, this encryption cannot be termed as commutative encryption,
since the each ciphertext of the same plaintext would be different in different time with overwhelming
probability, or say, (c1, c2, c3) = EB(EA(m)) is not fixed(in fact, the ciphertext is same unless the
randomly chosen variables k1, k2 are fixed).
DEFINITION 4 (Commutative-like Encryption). A commutative-like encryption F is a com-
putable (in polynomial time) function f : Key F× Dom F → Ran F , defined on finite computable
domains, that satisfies all properties listed below.
1. Commutative-like. For all e, e′ ∈ Key F we have
f−1e′ ◦ f
−1
e ◦ fe′ ◦ fe = I
2. The inverse f−1e is is a deterministic process (i.e., every ciphertext maps only one plaintext,
while a plaintext might map many ciphertext) and is also computable in polynomial-time given e.
3. The distribution of 〈x, fe(x), y, fe(y)〉 is indistinguishable from the distribution of 〈x, fe(x), y, z〉,
where x, y ∈r Dom F , z ∈r Ran F and e ∈r Key F .
Informally, Property 1 says that when we compositely encrypt with two different keys, the result
is the same irrespective of the order of decryption. Property 2 says that given an encrypted value
fe(x) and the encryption key e, we can find x in polynomial time, and there is only one such x.
Property 3 says that given a value x and its encryption fe(x) (but not the key e), for a new value y,
we cannot distinguish between fe(y) and a random value z in polynomial time. Thus we can neither
encrypt y nor decrypt fe(y) in polynomial time. Note that this property holds only if x is a random
value from Dom F , i.e., the adversary does not control the choice of x.
Now let us see how the encryption scheme fits the required properties. Obviously, the first and
second properties comes directly from the algorithms, now we check the third property. Note that
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if 〈x, fe(x), y, fe(y)〉 = 〈m1, g
kA ,m1g
kAx,m2, g
kB ,m2g
kBx〉 (where (mod P ) is neglected) is distin-
guishable from 〈m1, g
kA ,m1g
kAx,m2, z1, z2〉 (z1, z2 ∈RanF), then 〈g
kA , gkAx, gkB , gkBx〉 is distin-
guishable from the distribution of 〈gkA , gkAx, gkB , z〉 where z ∈r ZQ. the Decisional Diffie-Hellman
hypothesis (DDH) claims that for any generating (6= 1) element g, the distribution of 〈ga, gb, gab〉
is indistinguishable from the distribution of 〈ga, gb, gc〉. A 3-tuple 〈ga, gb, z〉 from the DDH can be
reduced to our 4-tuple 〈gkA , gkAx, gkB , z〉 by taking d ∈KeyF and making tuple 〈gd, (ga)d, gb, z〉.
Now a plays the role of x, gd of gkA , and gb of gkB ; we test whether gab or is random. Thus, given
DDH, 〈gkA , gkAx, gkB , gkBx〉 and 〈gkA , gkAx, gkB , z〉 are also indistinguishable, which contradicts our
assumption.
5. Application Instance
Readers might wonder the real application of commutative-like encryption, and here we propose one
possible application in oblivious transfer. Oblivious Transfer refers to a kind of two-party protocols
where at the beginning of the protocol one party, the sender, has an input, and at the end of the
protocol the other party, the receiver, learns some information about this input in a way that does
not allow the sender to figure out what it has learned. Oblivious transfer is a fundamental primitive
in the design and analysis of cryptographic protocols[14, 15]. Our scheme is a 1-out-of-n oblivious
transfer: the sender has n secrets m1,m2, . . . ,mn and is willing to disclose exactly one of them to
the receiver at its choice.
Now let us see how our protocol proceeds:
• The sender encrypts every item using its key xA and gets ExA(m1), ExA(m2), · · · , ExA(mn).
Then it reveals them to the receiver.
• On receiving the ciphertexts, the receiver chooses exactly one of them, say, ExA(mi)(1 ≤ i ≤
n), and encrypts it to obtain ExB (ExA(mi)) and tells it to the sender.
• The sender decrypts it, gets DxA(ExB (ExA(mi))) and sends it to the receiver.
• The receiver obtains mi by calculating DxB (DxA(ExB (ExA(mi)))).
Instead of a formal proof, we explain how the protocol achieves its goal: according to the perfor-
mance of commutative-like encryption, the receiver can get its desired message after interaction with
the sender, i.e., DxB (DxA(ExB (ExA(mi)))) = DxA(DxB (ExB (ExA(mi)))) = mi, thus the protocol
is correct. Furthermore, the receiver receives nothing other than mi: it can hardly deduce anything
from the ciphertexts ExA(mi)(1 ≤ i ≤ n). As for the privacy of the receiver, the sender does not
know the receiver’s choice i: it does not suggest mi from ExB (ExA(mi)).
It should noted that by trivially perform the protocol m times, we would obtain an m-out-of-n
oblivious transfer protocol.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we define the notion of commutative-like encryption, which is a useful variation of
commutative encryption. As an example, it is showed that the ElGamal scheme could be such a
commutative-like scheme. Also, we discussed one possible application of commutative-like encryp-
tion.
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